This paper assessed the relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment in Kenya. Secondary data on the Terrorism attacks and FDI from 2010 to 2012 was used for the study. Multiple regression model was used to test of the relationship between the study variables. By applying the model, the study found that terrorism negatively affects FDI in Kenya. It was concluded that Terrorism activities negatively affect the FDI in Kenya. Terrorism activities decrease the foreign investor confidence, which decrease the FDI. The Null hypothesis that there is no relationship between terrorism and FDI was thus rejected.
Introduction
Terrorism, like civil conflicts, may cause spillover costs among neighboring countries as a terrorist campaign in a neighbor dissuades capital inflows, or a regional multiplier causes lost economic activity in the terrorism-ridden country to resonate throughout the region. In some instances, terrorism may impact specific industries as 9/11 did on airlines and tourism (Drakos, 2004) . Another cost is the expensive security measures that must be instituted following large attacks such the massive homeland security outlays since 9/11 (Enders and Sandler, 2006) . Terrorism also raises the costs of doing business in terms of raising the insurance premiums, increasing the costs for security precautions, and larger salaries to employees at-risk.
According to Collier et al. (2003) , terrorist incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade. Kenya as a country has lost a lot of finances in the fight against terrorism. In one of the country's effort to counter terrorism, Kenya launched military operations in neighboring Somalia against Al Shabaab. Just as capital may take flight from a country plagued by a civil war, a sufficiently intense terrorist campaign may greatly reduce capital inflows (Enders and Sandler, 1996) .
In 1960s and 1970s, Kenya was a prime choice for foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in East Africa. Since 1980s, Kenya's combination of politically driven economic policies, rampant corruption, government malfeasance, substandard public services, and poor infrastructure discouraged foreign direct investment (FDI). Over the past three decades, Kenya has been a comparative under-performer in attracting FDI. Although the performance of Kenya in attracting FDI has been marginally better since the middle of the last decade, its performance still lags behind the neighbouring countries like Tanzania and Uganda in dollar terms, despite the fact that these are smaller economies.
Kenya has had its fare share of attacks including The US Embassy 1998 and the recent most devastating attack on Kenya's premier shopping mall (Westgate) on Saturday 21
st September 2013 which left 67 people dead. Economic growth may slow down with the continued terrorism threat with Somalia being in the immediate geographic proximity. Growth in the Economy slows down as attacks continue. Although studies investigating the impact of terrorism on FDI are new, they are currently gaining popularity following the devastating events in the United States on Sept. 11, 2001 . Shahbaz et al. (2013 did a study on the impact of terrorism on Foreign Direct Investment in Pakistan. They found that due to increase in the number of terrorist attacks foreign investor showing negative interest to invest money in Pakistan. This study therefore focuses on the Effect of terrorism on FDI in Kenya.
Problem Statement
It has been documented that the direct impact of terrorist attacks on productive capital is relatively modest. This seems to be true even for events of catastrophic terrorism. For example, Becker and Murphy (2001) estimated that the September 11th terrorist attacks resulted in a loss of 0.06% of the total productive assets of the US economy. Some authors have argued that terrorism is unlikely to exert a significant influence on economic activity in the long run. The calculations in Becker and Murphy (2001) bound the long-run effect of the September 11th attacks to 0.3% of GDP (IMF, 2001 and OECD, 2001 ).
Kenya as a third world economy is struggling with the effects of terrorism. The nation has suffered several attacks over the last few years beginning to the 1998 US Embassy bombings to the latest Westgate attack. On September 21, 2013, masked gunmen attacked the upscale Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, taking hostages and killing at least 67 people (Note 1). Almost 200 people, including at least 5 U.S. citizens, were wounded in the siege that took four days. The attack is the most deadly terrorist incident in Kenya since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi (Note 2). A Somali Islamist group, Al Shabaab having ties to Al Qaeda has claimed responsibility for the Westgate attack. It is therefore without doubt that the attacks have in one way of the other affected the Kenyan economy. This paper therefore seeks to determine the effect of terrorism of FDI in Kenya.
Objective of the Study
The main objective of this study is to determine the impact of Terrorism of FDI in Kenya.
Literature Review
This section presents relevant literature of the Effect of terrorism on the FDI and the trends of FDI in Kenya.
Impact of Terrorism of FDI
It is obvious that the losses of human life and suffering in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can be tremendous and maybe even considered as an economic loss particularly in today's society where numbers count. This study, however, aims only at the impact of terrorism expressed in terms of FDI.
The conceptualization and the calculation of economic costs of terrorism differ widely. Nevertheless, common ground that the criteria of economic costs comprise four major dimensions exists (Looney, 2002) . Those dimensions distinguish costs according to their nature, time period, impact and geographical range of impact. Another dimension that is sometimes added is the differentiation in targets of attacks. Jackson et al (2007: 22) distinguish in this regard between government, businesses and individuals. This distinction is, however, not mutually exclusive. Macro-and microeconomic cost effects need to be considered both in the short and long run and a differentiation between direct and indirect are taken into account. Additionally, both can include domestic as well as transnational effects.
The last dimension that is used in academic literature refers to the distinction of costs in macroeconomic or sectoral economic realms (Sandler and Enders, 2008: 21) . The main distinction between macro-and sectoral economic vulnerabilities is that the former relates to aggregate activities while the latter corresponds to sectoral activities (Ibid: 34). Macroeconomic costs are regarded as costs that have an impact on the overall national economy and can best be measured by indicators such as the GDP, FDI, exchange rates and imports/exports. Microeconomic or sectoral costs, in contrast, correspond to welfare losses for certain sectors in a country, such as transport, energy and telecommunication. This study will focus on the impact of terrorism on FDI.
The focus of this study is on both direct and indirect effects of terrorism on the macro economy and macroeconomic sectors. The direct impact of terrorist assaults can be determined relatively easily by summing up the costs of the material damage following an attack. Indirect effects are in contrast often hard to measure: 'Estimates of the costs of terror confront problems of different types, including the measurement of losses, aggregation issues, avoidance of double counting of damages in different sectors or statistics, and the causality of second round and indirect effects' (Bruck and Wickstrom, 2004: 294) . To circumvent the problems, various economic events have been used to specify indirect effect. The following events appear most frequently (Haj-Yehia, 2006 : Frey et al, 2007 : 2, DNB, 2005 : Uncertainty on financial markets diverts foreign resources away from the affected country and leads to a linked effect on stock markets; fear of terrorist attacks induces additional government spending on counterterrorism programs often making trade more expensive by a rise in transaction costs; fear of attacks additionally leads to a cutback of individual consumption causing an effect on private allocation by a shift of resources and uncertainty on financial markets causes a reduction of investment and a related decrease of the overall economic performance. and GDP. GDP is even considered to be an indicator of the status of an economy. It is necessary to point out that the key indicators described above are not exhaustive. Other indicators are, for instance, the effect of terrorism on exchange rates resulting from distrust in terrorism affected currency or effects on consumer sentiment, inflation, unemployment levels and interest rates (Morag, 2006; Major, 2003: 3) . This study only covers the first four, i.e. GDP, investment, consumption and trade, as they are the most widely used indicators of calculating the impact of crisis in general and terrorism specifically (Haj-Yehia, 2006 : Frey et al, 2007 : DNB, 2005 .
A study presented in a seminar organized by Crotian National Bank empirically investigated how international terrorism and institutional factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from rich countries. He employed a sample of 23 FDI sending countries in the period from 1995 to 2010, and used the sample selection correction method to address the missing observations problem. The findings revealed that on average, if FDI host country increases the number of terrorist attacks towards investor by one standard deviation, there is a decrease in the flow of investment by 14 percent of the average FDI share in a host's GDP. The findings also revealed that that if one investor experiences an attack, other investors suffer from a negative spillover effect. Finally, the study revealed that that in the last 16 years by the time of the study, perceived political stability is the most important factor for FDI investments (The Eight Young Economists Seminar, 2013). Persitz (2005) evaluated the effect of Palestinian terror on the Israeli economy by using counterfactual methodology and quarterly data for the macroeconomic aggregates of Israel and OECD countries from 1980 to 2003. He found that, since 1994,had there been no terror in Israel, the country's per-capita GDP in 2003 would have been 8.6% higher than it was. Predictions based on low future levels of terror and the absence of a peace process produced good out-of-sample fit for [2003] [2004] [2005] . Palestinian terror increased the shares of government expenditures and consumption and decreased the shares of trade balance and investment in GDP. Also observed was weak evidence of a structural change at the aggregate level. Shahbaz et al. (2012) did a study to examine the relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment. They used data from 2000 to 2011, the ordinary least square testing approach is used to examine the relationship in two variables. This methodology was used to check the linearity and normality of the data. By applying the model, they found that terrorism has significant negative effect on foreign direct investment of Pakistan. The findings revealed that due to increase in the number of terrorist attacks, foreign investors showed negative interest to invest money in Pakistan. Of course, not all this variation in FDI can be attributed to the effect of the September 11th attacks. As of September 2001 FDI inflows had fallen from its 2000 peak not only in the US but also in other developed economies (UNCTAD, 2002) . These figures motivate the question of the extent to which an increase in the perceived level of terrorism was responsible for the drop in FDI in the US that followed the events of September 11th. Surveys of international corporate investors provide direct evidence of the importance of terrorism on foreign investment. Terrorism is rated by corporate investors as one of the most important factors influencing their FDI decisions (Global Business Policy Council, 2004).
Trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Statistics in Kenya
Through the 80's and 90's, the deterioration in economic performance, together with rising problems of poor infrastructure, corruption, high cost of borrowing, crime and insecurity, and lack of investor confidence in reforms generated a long period of low FDI inflow. Despite its potential, Kenya is still not attracting adequate long-term capital inflows to power its growth. Kenya receives less long-term capital inflows than any other country in the EAC region. According to CBK balance of payment data, official medium and long terms flows, which are mainly project loans (including defense loans), increased from US$ 527 million in 2010, to US$ 612 million in 2011, and then to US$ 1,449 million in 2012. However, foreign direct investment (FDI) remained subdued, as Kenya received only US$ 177 million (2010), US$ 140 million (2011) and US$ 164 million (2012) according to CBK data. UNCTAD data on the other hand shows that Kenya received US$ 178.1 million (2010) and US$ 335 million (2011) in FDI. Kenya's performance in attracting foreign investment remains limited compared to its peers. The FDI Kenya attracted was only equivalent to 0.8 percent of its GDP in 2010-11, compared to Rwanda (1.2 percent of GDP), Tanzania (2.8 percent of GDP), and Uganda (6.2 percent of GDP) in the same period (see Figure 1.24) . However, following the recent peaceful elections, and given the improvements in the governance framework since the new Constitution was adopted in 2010, FDI to Kenya is expected to increase in the future.
In Kenya, the stock of Foreign Liabilities increased by 26.3% from KSh 340,128 million in 2007 to KSh 429,585 million in 2008 with FDI accounting for 63.8% of the total liabilities at KSh 274,004 million. Analysis of external liabilities stock by the regional economic blocs reveal that Europe accounted for 69.7% of the total liabilities with the European Union accounting for 67.1 %. America, Asia and Africa accounted for 18.5%, 6.2% and 5.6%, respectively. The stock of Foreign Liabilities from China and India more than doubled over the period. The tax regime, particularly tax administration; insecurity and corruption; cost and efficiency of road and inland transport; cost and supply of electricity had a significant negative effect on operation of businesses. Survey results also revealed that interest rates, exchange rate and inflation rate were perceived to have a net negative effect on investment decisions. However, access to international markets; internal finance and regional finance was perceived to have a net positive effect. This suggests that apart from the domestic market investors place great importance on international markets still. The survey findings indicated that both telecommunication and internet use had a significant impact on investment decisions (KNBS, 2013).
Enterprises reported that they were likely to increase the range of products and services, staff training, recruitment of local staff, investment in technology, export of the products and improvement of existing facilities in the medium term. Those who planned to expand investment in technology comprised 78.1 % of the respondents while those intending to improve existing facilities and staff training was 72.9 % and 72.8 % of the enterprises, respectively. More than half of the enterprises plan to expand their businesses in the next three years (KNBS, 2013) .
A variety of factors explain low FDI in Kenya (i) infrastructure bottlenecks both in energy and roads have been a major constraint on FDI, (ii) Kenya's labor productivity has been falling in the recent past, while at the same time, labour costs have been rising fast compared to their productivity and (iii) The regulatory environment in Kenya has been hostile to FDI and impeded it. Excessive regulations have hindered entrepreneurial activity, as firms spend more time and resources complying with rules and regulations. This study focuses on the effect of Terrorism of FDI in Kenya. Source: UNCTAD website.
Methodology
Dependent variable of this study is foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kenya and Independent variable is terrorism. FDI is measured by Net inflow of foreign direct investment in USD and Terrorism is measured by No of terrorist attacks in Kenya. Sample of this study, which is used to evaluate relationship, is from 2010-2012, which consists of three years. Secondary data is used to conclude results on the basis of finding of study. Data of terrorist attacks is collected from different sources such as Nation Media reports and foreign direct investment data is collected from UNCTAD website.
Null and alternative hypothesis of this research study are:
Ho: There is no relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment in Kenya 
Conclusions
From the findings of the study, it can be concluded that Terrorism activities negatively affect the FDI in Kenya. Terrorism activities decrease the foreign investor confidence, which decrease the FDI. The Null hypothesis that there is no relationship between terrorism and FDI is rejected. These findings are inline with the findings of a study presented at the Eight Young Economists Seminar (2013) where they found that on average, if FDI host country increases the number of terrorist attacks towards investor by one standard deviation, there is a decrease in the flow of investment by 14 percent of the average FDI share in a host's GDP. The findings also revealed that that if one investor experiences an attack, other investors suffer from a negative spillover effect. Finally, the study revealed that that in the last 16 years by the time of the study perceived political stability is the most important factor for FDI investments. The findings are also supported by Shahbaz et al. (2012) study examining the relationship between terrorism and foreign direct investment where they found that due to increase in the number of terrorist attacks, foreign investors showed negative interest to invest money in Pakistan.
